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SEX, LIES, AND GOFFMAN: 
EMBODIMENT AND FABRICATION IN THE AGE OF AIDS 1
Michael R. Hill
Department of Sociology
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
THE FREQUENTLY INEXORABLE fatality, pansexual communicability, and lengthy periodof asymptomatic latency of HIV combine to form biological realities and ecological dangersthat are individually and socially problematic at very deep levels.  How can we think
sociologically about the AIDS epidemic?  Talcott Parsons’ concept of “sick role,”2 a venerable and
productive staple of medical sociology, gives us little to work with here, precisely as sexually active,
HIV-positive but undiagnosed and asymptomatic persons do not see themselves as “sick.”  Nor,
importantly, do others, including:  sexual intimates, friends, family members, employers, and health
professionals.  The interpersonal face of HIV is often trusted, sexually inviting, and deceptively
healthy.  In choosing sexual partners today, the age of AIDS confronts us with our vulnerabilities
as embodied beings living together in institutionally-ordered, bureaucratized lifeworlds.  This case
study places these vulnerabilities within the reach of contemporary sociological thought, with
particular emphasis on Erving Goffman’s penultimate work:  Frame Analysis.
In making foundational use of Goffman’s general metatheory of meaning, the central analytic
thread in this chapter is deeply structuralist.  Much that rings true in this core framework is extended
by—and contextualized in—the structuralist aspects of recent works by Michel Foucault, Anthony
Giddens, and Niklas Luhmann.  I draw also upon the phenomenology of Alfred Schultz and such
critical dimensions of neo-Marxist thinking that focus on the lived realities and consequences of
class inequality and what Mary Jo Deegan (1985) calls multiple minority statuses.  Given these
standpoints, I offer what must be necessarily a brief tour of the HIV/AIDS crisis from my
perspective as a sociologist.  
ECOLOGICAL DANGERS
To begin, it is worth stressing that the AIDS virus is a biological agent, explainable in our
cosmology by reference to what Goffman calls the “natural framework.”  As a biological agent, this
virus is external to society (which I understood to be a set or system of interrelated social
institutions).3  The virus infiltrates and subsequently kills the human organisms essential for the
     1 Paper presented to the Social Psychology Study Group, Department of Sociology, University
of Nebraska-Lincoln, March 16, 1993.
     2  The Social System.  New York:  Free Press, 1951.
     3  The concept of “system” is exceptionally inclusive and, therefore, potentially powerful:  A
system is a set of interrelated elements within an environment demarcated by a more or less
permeable boundary.
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propagation, maintenance, and reproduction of human social systems.  Thus, the AIDS virus is a
social treat via the extent to which it can eradicate all (or consequentially significant numbers) of
human organisms.
The threat posed by AIDS to a society has the characteristics of what Niklas Luhmann (1989: 
28) calls exposure to an ecological danger.  Such a danger, as a component of the environment
external to a social system, 
can make itself noticed only by means of communicative irritations or disturbances,
and then these have to react to themselves.
When ecological dangers result finally in recognizable resonances within standing institutional
patterns, it becomes possible, albeit in very limited ways, for us to conceptualize and communicate
about a potential ecological catastrophe.
An important aspect of Luhmann’s theory of ecological communication is that societies
cannot know about or respond to external dangers when institutional resonance is lacking.  The
history of the HIV/AIDS epidemic is a chilling illustration.  During the early phases of the outbreak,
no one recognized AIDS as a new disease.  Institutional resonance was absent until sufficiently large
numbers of people died, creating an “irritation,” to use Luhmann’s language, about which
institutional communication ensued, prompting a search for the cause of the deaths, and, in turn,
discovering the viral etiology of AIDS.
Had it been that the AIDS virus could spread far more quickly and efficiently than appears
to be the case, our social system would have been completely blind sided—and eliminated.  As
Luhmann and Giddens both observe, we may very well be subject in future to the apocalyptic
ravages of an ecological danger that is currently—and totally unknown to us—infiltrating our
biological organisms as we breathe, sneeze, and shake hands with each other.  Societies are
vulnerable to ecological dangers, and there is nothing that we can do about this situation.  As
Luhmann puts it, bluntly, we cannot see what we cannot see.  It is not a matter, in this situation, of
improving our existing surveillance capabilities, because the ecological dangers that are potentially
most catastrophic may be threats that we will not recognize until it is much too late for our
institutions to respond adequately.
Fortunately, it appears in the instance of HIV/AIDS that institutional resonance developed
before time ran out for society as a whole.  But, the near universal infiltration of the virus via blood
transfusions throughout the population of hemophiliacs is a stark reminder of our collective
vulnerability to ecological dangers.  The less comprehensive but no less tragic decimation of male
homosexual communities in the United States is a further example.  Indeed, the early misconception
that the spread of HIV/AIDS was limited to homosexual transmission illustrates all to clearly the
inability of American social institutions to recognize the true contours of the danger it faced, and
continues to face.  Institutional susceptibility to a biological danger, in this case HIV/AIDS, provides
the material backdrop for furthering the sociological discussion of vulnerability, this time as it
applies directly to interpersonal interactions and our social constructions of our material reality. 
3REFLEXIVITY, SURVEILLANCE AND THE INDIVIDUAL
The same material conditions that make it impossible for societies to see what they cannot
see also prevent individuals from knowing that their bodies have been infiltrated by a latent,
asymptomatic biological agent.  The surveillance problem that hangs over society as a whole also
has individual counterparts.  With exposure to HIV/AIDS, the latency period can extend to as long
as ten years and beyond.  During latency, the individual organism experiences nothing physically
that suggests “illness” or a problematic situation.  We can smugly congratulate ourselves on being
reflexive organisms, but reflexivity requires input (or a “strip” to use Goffman’s term) capable of
being sensed and then framed (or made sense of) in some meaningful way.
During latency, in order to know positively if one has contracted HIV, one must submit to
an expert screening and diagnostic procedure; an example of what Giddens calls the necessity in our
modern era of placing trust in expert systems.  The test regimen includes a series of at least two
positive screening tests and a confirming Western Blot test.  Most people, however, have little
motivation to undergo testing.  Major exceptions include:  (a) states where HIV testing is required
for marriage licenses, (b) some categories of federal employment, including military service, (c)
blood donation, or (d) known or suspected exposure to the virus.  Complicating the situation is the
obvious fact that a negative test result at a given point in time says nothing about a person’s status
vis a vis infection at subsequent dates.
In lieu of a confirming series of positive tests or a recent and reliable negative test result, an
individual’s self-estimate of his/her HIV status depends primarily (if not wholly) upon two factors: 
(1) self-assessments of his/her personal health and (2) self-estimates of the likelihood of contagion. 
Both factors allow enormous latitude for self-deception, and are greatly complicated by the
extended, asymptomatic nature of HIV latency.  In sum, the informal, day-to-day reflexive
monitoring of our bodies provides no discernable clues or signs concerning HIV status during what
could be years of latency.  As there is no available cure for this fatal disease, it might be well not
to know the truth of one’s infection and inevitable death—were it not for the fact that early detection
and treatment can prolong the period before death, and the horrible reality that infected persons can
communicate the virus to others during the latent period.
TRUST AND INTIMACY
HIV/AIDS transmission can be accomplished in diverse ways, but the most deeply
problematic from a social and individual standpoint is infection resulting from homosexual and
heterosexual intercourse.  This problematic arises from the relatively high degree of trust and
interpersonal affection commonly associated with sexual intimacy in this society, especially in
committed and socially sanctioned relationships.  For many persons within committed heterosexual
relationships, sexual union not only symbolizes but also concretely realizes the creation and
continuity of human life.  Due to the biological reality of HIV/AIDS, the trusting, intimate act that
creates life can now become, simultaneously, the means of disease, disfigurement, and death. 
Betrayal of sexual trust is a common enough theme in western imagery, but at no time since the
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early 1900s have the potential consequences of a sexually transmitted disease been so
catastrophically lethal.
Giddens goes to great lengths to draw the modern world as a temporal and spatial locale in
which trust in professional experts and technological intrusions pervade the intimacies of our day-to-
day lives.  This is important work, but the reality and deadly biological simplicity of the HIV/AIDS
crisis underscores a more old-fashioned dimension of trust in our modern world, specifically:  the
confidences and responsibilities so often promised and assumed between committed sexual
intimates.  It is to this aspect of trust that Goffman’s analysis of fabrication is directly applicable and
to which the remainder of this discussion is devoted.
Ostensibly at issue here are the responsibilities that sexual intimates have to avoid
contracting and transmitting HIV/AIDS to each other.  In legal terms, it takes little to establish a
situation reasonably characterized as confidential.  For example:  
It has been cogently argued that “[p]artners to the sexual intercourse, if only for a
brief time, share a trust and intimacy that elevates their relationship from the level
of mere friend or acquaintance.  Their confidential relationship should invoke a
heightened duty, requiring disclosure of specific facts as circumstances dictate:  the
risk of contracting an incurable disease demands disclosure even to one with whom
intimacy has only briefly been shared.”  (Herman 1978: 166).
That is to say, where a party to sexual intimacy has knowledge of or reason to suspect that he/she
is or may be HIV positive, he/she has an institutionally sanctioned responsibility to reveal this
situation to his/her sexual partner(s).  But, it is not the moral or institutional imperatives per se that
I want to emphasize.  Those issues are perceptively analyzed by Sissela Bok.  Rather, I am interested
in understanding, theoretically, the structural possibilities that enable lethal prevarications between
intimates.
SEX AND FABRICATIONS
Goffman’s analyses of lies and lying (or fabrications) are particularly cogent chapters in
Frame Analysis.  The groundwork for his explication of lying rests on the idea of keys and keying. 
Keying is a process whereby something that is already meaningful in terms of a primary framework
(of which there are two, social and natural) is transformed systematically into something similar yet
essential different.  For example, consider the transformation of something serious, say a friend
dying of AIDS, into a serio-comedic stage play (or dramatic scripting) about someone dying of
AIDS.  A central aspect of keying is that all participants in a given social frame, say a funeral home
or a theater, know what the organizing frame is.  A basic axiom for Goffman’s theory is the
proposition that anything that can be framed (or made meaningful) can be keyed.  Further, anything
that can be keyed can be keyed again, and so on.
The easy facility with which established frames can be keyed and rekeyed is, I  argue
elsewhere, a tragic flaw (if you will) in our cosmological system that makes it very easy for us to
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invest a lot of energy keying and rekeying problematic frames rather than doing anything concrete
to change or act effectively upon the problematic patterns.  For example, heterosexual transmission
of HIV/AIDS has within the past few years been framed and keyed in the public media as a
significant “social problem.”  Almost as quickly, a book by Michael Fumento titled The Myth of
Heterosexual AIDS 4 attempted, referencing much of the same empirical data, to argue that
heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDS is not a problem.  The result all too often in such
circumstances is continuing and distracting debate and unending calls for “more research” rather
than effective, concentrated social action.
Fabrication, by contrast with a key, intentionally induces a situation where one or more
persons (dupes) are kept in the dark concerning the real frame or actual state of affairs.  Thus, when
a known HIV-positive person has sexual intercourse with someone without revealing his/her
contagious condition to his/her partner, Goffman would speak of a perpetrator who has contained
a dupe in an exploitive fabrication.  Several axiomatic principles follow, including the insight that
anything that can be framed can be fabricated.  Further, anything that can be keyed can be
fabricated.  And, conversely, anything that can be fabricated can be keyed.
Where fabrication consists of lying (or concealment) in the case of known HIV/AIDS
infections, the material realities of human embodiment come in heavily on the side of the liar in two
important ways.  First, as noted above, the perpetrator’s body exhibits no physical manifestations
of the infection such that a cautious or suspicious partner could make a correct determination of the
operative or real frame through interpersonal surveillance or inspection.  Second, knowledge of truth
or falsity is contained on the “inside” of the perpetrator’s body, i.e., within his/her brain, where it
is unavailable for intersubjectively verifiable inspection by interested third parties.  In sum, lying
is made possible by the inside/outside construction of the human body, and no amount of moral
suasion concerning the rightness or wrongness of lying can eradicate this ever present possibility. 
Hence, existentially, we must learn to live at all times under the certain possibility that we may be
contained in any number of fabricated frames.   For sexually active humans in the age of AIDS, this
is a structural reality of no small moment.
The natural world, it turns out, has not been egalitarian in distributing the potential risk of
HIV/AIDS transmission/infection in heterosexual relationships.  All things equal, a woman
apparently stands a somewhat higher risk of being infected by an HIV-positive male than vice versa. 
In addition, women also stand at risk of other outcomes of unprotected sex, not the least of which
is pregnancy and the possibility of giving birth to an HIV-positive baby.  Pragmatically, women
must be particularly alert to containment by HIV-infected men.  Unfortunately, the normative
expectation of maintaining trust in those we love pre-positions women in affectionate heterosexual
relationships for cruel and unwanted consequences.  It is one of Goffman’s astute observations that
the points at which were are most likely to be contained in really serious fabrications are precisely
those situations in which, ostensibly, we have the least reason to fear being duped.
     4 New York:  Basic Books, 1990.
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A crucial issue related to heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDS is participation in what
have been termed “high risk” behaviors, such as frequent, unprotected sex with multiple partners. 
Under the law, a person who understands what constitutes risky behavior and who nonetheless
engages in it incurs an obligation to inform his/her potential sexual partners that they are, therefore,
at risk also.  Self-report studies of college students and of males who purchase sexual encounters
from female prostitutes suggest, however, that many men and women who know “the facts” about
HIV/AIDS routinely discount the riskiness of their own sexual practices.  A  shocking although
common revelation is that respondents are confident of their ability to detect HIV/AIDS infections
in other people on the basis of physical inspection and their personal knowledge of their partners’
background and behavior patterns.  In this way, unwarranted social constructions of others’ bodies
as “healthy” under conditions of HIV infection contribute directly to the biological vulnerability of
the body to unseen ecological dangers.
Such social constructions in matters sexual give stability and apparent certainty in situations
where reality may in fact be somewhat slipperier.  For example,  attribution of paternity to a legally
designated husband must in many cases be a convenient fiction, especially given the reported
frequency in the US of extramarital intimacies, a point I have noted elsewhere (Hill 1987: 76-77):
With high rates of teenage promiscuity and pregnancy, not to mention multiple-
partner sexual liaisons among adults both married and single, it is reasonable to
conclude that in significantly increasing numbers of pregnancies there is no
congruence between the genetic father and the genitor/pater in many so-called
“ideal” marriages.  Without a court test and paternity evidence provided to the
contrary, the vast majority in this society are quite happy to assume and act as though
the husband in a conjugal nuclear family is necessarily the genetic father of his
children, even when a quick calculation of the odds could easily lead to alternate
conclusions.
In sum, it strikes me as vital that social research in matters sexual must carefully and sensitively
examine the ways in which we frame our bodies and socially construct (and re-construct) the lived
realities of sexual intimacy.
I conclude by reminding us that fabrication can work in any number of unexpected ways. 
For example, there will no doubt be documented cases of persons claiming to be HIV-positive, when
they are in fact negative, for the sole purpose of provoking and/or rationalizing the break-up of an
on-going relationship.  Such a ploy could, of course, result in vicious retaliation by an angered
sexual partner and/or stigmatization if the false claim became widely known and accepted as true. 
As the relevant cultural epigram observes: Oh, what tangled webs we weave!
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